POL-026Build up Small BusinessesPolicy proposal

Enforce Prompt Payment of Small Businesses

Large corporations above a defined revenue threshold will be required to pay small business suppliers within a fixed maximum payment period, with automatic financial penalties applying for late payment.

Taking partSign in to save your vote.
  1. Idea
  2. Discussion
  3. Voting
  4. Implementation

Voting is open.

Proposed by
Fusion Working Group
Applies to
Fusion NationalAuthority: Fusion National
Ballot wording
Original recorded wording · 27 Oct 202611 ballots cast · 0 contributions
Policy Registry
Not yet adoptedUpdated

Key commitments

7 commitments
  1. Small businesses will receive revenue sooner, making cashflow less fragile between invoicing and payment.

  2. Small businesses will face fewer financing gaps caused by large customers delaying payment after work has already been completed.

  3. Pricing decisions will become more sustainable when suppliers no longer need to build long payment delays into their margins.

  4. Business planning will become more reliable when payment timing is clear and less discretionary.

  5. Supplier relationships will become less one-sided when large customers cannot use delayed payment as a source of working capital without consequence.

  6. Competition will shift away from which supplier can tolerate the longest delay and back toward price, quality, and reliability.

  7. More small businesses will be able to expand with larger customers without carrying financing burdens those customers are better placed to absorb.

Rationale & background

Rationale & background

Design rationale

Small businesses often deliver labour, goods, or services well before they are paid, while larger customers can use delayed payment as a de facto source of working capital. This shifts financing responsibility back onto the party with greater balance-sheet capacity by making payment timing a binding obligation rather than a discretionary commercial practice.

Payment discipline framework

  1. The rule requires payment within a fixed statutory maximum period, so delayed payment cannot be treated as a routine commercial bargaining tool.
  2. Automatic penalties matter because the obligation is only likely to change behaviour if paying late becomes materially less attractive than paying on time.
  3. The rule depends on clear trigger events for when the payment clock starts, because large customers will otherwise have incentives to shift delay into invoice acceptance, approval staging, or procedural review.

Commercial power asymmetry

  1. Large customers may be expected to treat delayed payment as a low-visibility way to push financing pressure onto smaller suppliers that have less bargaining power and less access to working capital. A binding maximum payment period changes that relationship by limiting the extent to which payment timing can be dictated by the stronger party after the work has already been done.
  2. Some large customers may be expected to respond by pressing harder on price or favouring suppliers with stronger balance sheets. But where prompt payment discipline applies across major buyers, delayed payment becomes less available as a hidden commercial advantage and suppliers are less likely to compete by informally financing their customers through tolerance of long payment periods.

Risk and failure modes

  1. Large customers may be expected to look for ways to convert late payment into procedural delay by stretching invoice approval processes, disputing invoices more aggressively, or redefining when payment is treated as due. The rule is less vulnerable to this where the payment clock is tied to clear statutory trigger points and where genuine invoice disputes are distinguished from ordinary delay.
  2. Avoidance pressure may also arise through procurement intermediaries, related entities, or contract structures designed to keep the substantive commercial relationship while shifting formal liability. Integrity depends on whether the rule follows the real purchasing relationship rather than narrow contractual form.
  3. The rule can also underperform if small suppliers must individually pursue every breach against repeat customers with much greater leverage. In practice, the deterrent effect depends heavily on automatic penalty accrual, accessible complaint pathways, and credible regulator-backed enforcement, because formal rights alone are often weak where suppliers fear retaliation or loss of future work.

System interaction

This measure interacts with unfair contract term rules, procurement standards, and small business dispute pathways, because payment discipline is easier to sustain where large customers cannot contract around invoice timing or use dispute processes as a cover for delay.

Implementation outline

Legislation would define the covered large-customer class, protected small-business supplier class, maximum payment period, payment-clock trigger, treatment of disputed invoices and staged contracts, and the form of automatic penalties, supported by complaint and enforcement powers that do not rely entirely on supplier-initiated litigation.

Member ballot

Ballot open
What you’re deciding

Large corporations above a defined revenue threshold will be required to pay small business suppliers within a fixed maximum payment period, with automatic financial penalties applying for late payment.

Review commitments
Ballot record

Wording: Original recorded wording · 27 Oct 2026

How many people need to vote?

Quorum met

Engage needs at least 30 eligible registered members before its ballots can make decisions. Each ballot also needs enough people to take part.

Eligible registered members
37 · platform quorum met
Recently active members
14 in the last 90 days
Participants needed
7
Votes recorded so far
11 of 7 needed

You can vote for, vote against or abstain. All three count towards participation. The final calculation happens when voting closes, so the number needed can change as members become active or inactive.

11 votes have been recorded. Sign in to vote if you are eligible.

Your ballotSelect to preview
Voting closes 8 December 2026

Select Approve, Abstain, or Reject above to start your ballot.

Vote totals

11 verified votes

10 approve · 0 abstain · 1 reject

Your vote is identifiable to national administrators and authorised national ballot reviewers. Aggregate results are public; a very small ballot may reveal individual choices. Privacy Policy

Formal amendments

0

Suggest exact changes to a title, summary, commitment or rationale paragraph. Voting on an amendment is separate from voting on the main proposal.

No formal amendments have been proposed yet.

Discussion

0 contributions

Share evidence, ask a question or suggest an improvement. Discussion scores do not count as ballot votes.

Have a perspective on this proposal?

Verified members can sign in to comment or vote on contributions.

Sign in to participate

No contributions yet. Verified members can start the discussion using the form above.

Wording history and sources

1 snapshot

See how the wording has changed and which version was put to a ballot. References below provide background; they do not by themselves establish prior adoption.

  1. Original recorded wording · 27 Oct 2026legacy-aLatestBallot wording
    27 Oct 2026 · Initial wording

Policy background and sources

References to earlier policy and notes about what is known of its history.

New proposal · No prior policy identified

Explicitly recorded in the AGM Round 1 lineage notes as having no pre-existing approved Fusion policy, submission, or statement.

Scrutiny note: Requires formal member review and vote as a new party policy proposal.

Prior policy predecessors

Values & principles alignment

  • Principle: *Inclusive Economic Advancement* — Enforceable payment periods reduce the financing burden imposed on smaller suppliers.