Decision record

Enforce Prompt Payment of Small Businesses

Policy proposalOpen vote

Outcome

Voted wording

Ballot wording
Revision ID
legacy-a2969f72562a2a3bd64fc0b79d0423ab14a87cae2526c59c37aa07e4079dbacc
Content hash
38ee0b49758f62989e32ec23815ed49813dcc08436595da3af16a72bbee1230c
Recorded
27 Oct 2026

Enforce Prompt Payment of Small Businesses

Large corporations above a defined revenue threshold will be required to pay small business suppliers within a fixed maximum payment period, with automatic financial penalties applying for late payment.

Outcomes

  • Small businesses will receive revenue sooner, making cashflow less fragile between invoicing and payment.
  • Small businesses will face fewer financing gaps caused by large customers delaying payment after work has already been completed.
  • Pricing decisions will become more sustainable when suppliers no longer need to build long payment delays into their margins.
  • Business planning will become more reliable when payment timing is clear and less discretionary.
  • Supplier relationships will become less one-sided when large customers cannot use delayed payment as a source of working capital without consequence.
  • Competition will shift away from which supplier can tolerate the longest delay and back toward price, quality, and reliability.
  • More small businesses will be able to expand with larger customers without carrying financing burdens those customers are better placed to absorb.

Design rationale

Small businesses often deliver labour, goods, or services well before they are paid, while larger customers can use delayed payment as a de facto source of working capital. This shifts financing responsibility back onto the party with greater balance-sheet capacity by making payment timing a binding obligation rather than a discretionary commercial practice.

Payment discipline framework

  1. The rule requires payment within a fixed statutory maximum period, so delayed payment cannot be treated as a routine commercial bargaining tool.
  2. Automatic penalties matter because the obligation is only likely to change behaviour if paying late becomes materially less attractive than paying on time.
  3. The rule depends on clear trigger events for when the payment clock starts, because large customers will otherwise have incentives to shift delay into invoice acceptance, approval staging, or procedural review.

Commercial power asymmetry

  1. Large customers may be expected to treat delayed payment as a low-visibility way to push financing pressure onto smaller suppliers that have less bargaining power and less access to working capital. A binding maximum payment period changes that relationship by limiting the extent to which payment timing can be dictated by the stronger party after the work has already been done.
  2. Some large customers may be expected to respond by pressing harder on price or favouring suppliers with stronger balance sheets. But where prompt payment discipline applies across major buyers, delayed payment becomes less available as a hidden commercial advantage and suppliers are less likely to compete by informally financing their customers through tolerance of long payment periods.

Risk and failure modes

  1. Large customers may be expected to look for ways to convert late payment into procedural delay by stretching invoice approval processes, disputing invoices more aggressively, or redefining when payment is treated as due. The rule is less vulnerable to this where the payment clock is tied to clear statutory trigger points and where genuine invoice disputes are distinguished from ordinary delay.
  2. Avoidance pressure may also arise through procurement intermediaries, related entities, or contract structures designed to keep the substantive commercial relationship while shifting formal liability. Integrity depends on whether the rule follows the real purchasing relationship rather than narrow contractual form.
  3. The rule can also underperform if small suppliers must individually pursue every breach against repeat customers with much greater leverage. In practice, the deterrent effect depends heavily on automatic penalty accrual, accessible complaint pathways, and credible regulator-backed enforcement, because formal rights alone are often weak where suppliers fear retaliation or loss of future work.

System interaction

This measure interacts with unfair contract term rules, procurement standards, and small business dispute pathways, because payment discipline is easier to sustain where large customers cannot contract around invoice timing or use dispute processes as a cover for delay.

Implementation outline

Legislation would define the covered large-customer class, protected small-business supplier class, maximum payment period, payment-clock trigger, treatment of disputed invoices and staged contracts, and the form of automatic penalties, supported by complaint and enforcement powers that do not rely entirely on supplier-initiated litigation.

Policy Lineage

  • No specific pre-existing Fusion policy, submission, or statement.

Values Alignment

  • Principle: Inclusive Economic Advancement — Enforceable payment periods reduce the financing burden imposed on smaller suppliers.

Ballot and result

Ballot ID
proposal:POL-026
Purpose
Decision on this proposal
Electorate
Party-wide
Status
Open
Wording
legacy-a2969f72562a2a3bd64fc0b79d0423ab14a87cae2526c59c37aa07e4079dbaccBound to voted wording
Closes
8 Dec 2026, 6:00 pm

Amendments

No amendments were filed.

Revision history

Every revision is immutable. Later edits create a new revision.
RevisionRecordedContent hashNote
Original recorded wording · 27 Oct 2026legacy-a2969f72562a2a3bd64fc0b79d0423ab14a87cae2526c59c37aa07e4079dbacc27 Oct 202638ee0b49758f62989e32ec23815ed49813dcc08436595da3af16a72bbee1230c
Ballot wording

Publication

Not published

No policy record exists for this proposal, so nothing has been ratified or published.