POL-025Build up Small BusinessesPolicy proposal

Ease the Squeeze on Small Business

Large corporations will pay an increased company tax rate equal to the gap between the national inflation rate and the upper bound of the Reserve Bank target band, with the rate returning to its baseline once inflation moves back within the target range.

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Proposed by
Fusion Working Group
Applies to
Fusion NationalAuthority: Fusion National
Ballot wording
Original recorded wording · 27 Oct 202610 ballots cast · 0 contributions
Policy Registry
Not yet adoptedUpdated

Key commitments

7 commitments
  1. Small businesses will face less volatile input prices, making it easier to set prices and manage cashflow.

  2. Small businesses will experience fewer margin squeezes caused by fast-moving cost increases that outpace their ability to reprice.

  3. Fewer abrupt cost spikes will reduce the frequency of emergency price rises that risk losing customers.

  4. Large firms will be less likely to lift prices ahead of actual cost increases during inflation scares.

  5. Business planning will become more reliable as inflation expectations stabilise earlier.

  6. Supplier negotiations will become less disruptive when rapid price escalation is less common.

  7. Consumer spending patterns will become more predictable as essential costs stabilise sooner.

Rationale & background

Rationale & background

Design rationale

Small businesses typically have limited pricing power, limited access to hedging, and limited capacity to absorb rapid cost increases. Thise temporary uplift would function as a counter-cyclical stabiliser, increasing fiscal pressure on large firms when inflation is above the target band, with the aim of reducing inflation persistence and volatility that disproportionately disrupts small business operations.

Key design questions for scrutiny

  1. Scope definition matters because corporate groups can be structured in ways that shift where profits are recorded across related entities.
  2. Choice of inflation measure affects timing and responsiveness, because published inflation data is periodic and may not track sector-specific price pressures.

Structurally controlled risks

  1. A “large corporation” definition can create boundary behaviour, including incentives to shape headcount reporting, group structure, or timing at year-end to avoid being classified as large, particularly where a business sits close to multiple thresholds at once. Yet because the Corporations Act test requires meeting at least two of three criteria (employees plus either revenue or assets), simple single-metric gaming is constrained and many near-boundary manoeuvres need to be sustained across more than one dimension, while consolidated-group treatment reduces the scope to split entities purely to stay below the line.

Market-controlled risks

  1. Large firms may be expected to try to preserve after-tax margins and respond by lifting prices during uplift periods, particularly in concentrated markets where customers have fewer alternatives. But since more influential businesses would be raising their own tax more by raising prices, the uplift is levied on aggregate profits rather than on each sale, it unwinds automatically when inflation returns to band, and any attempt to embed it into prices remains constrained by competitive pressure and demand response once the uplift switches off, there are multiple incentives not to respond in this way.
  2. A temporary uplift could be expected to reduce after-tax returns enough to defer discretionary investment, particularly where projects have short payback horizons and boards are already cautious in volatile conditions. Yet because the uplift is conditional and self-reversing, and because the same high-inflation environment that activates it typically drives financing costs and demand uncertainty that overwhelm marginal tax differences, investment decisions are less likely to pivot on the uplift itself, especially for long-horizon capital allocation.
  3. A lagged inflation statistic could be expected to produce mistiming, with the uplift switching on after inflation momentum has already turned or lingering after conditions have eased, creating a risk of policy “after-effects” that don’t match the live economy. Even so, a public and rule-based trigger makes the regime predictable in advance, sustained above-band inflation is visible in real-world pricing trends before official releases, and the automatic unwind limits persistence once inflation returns to band, which together reduces the scope for prolonged mismatch driven by discretionary delay.
  4. Inflation episodes can be expected to vary in responsiveness, because genuine supply shocks can force price rises regardless of tax settings and a profits-based uplift has limited leverage over the underlying cost driver. Still, where inflation persistence is being amplified by price-setting behaviour — including premature price rises based on expected shocks rather than realised input costs — the uplift creates a counter-incentive for captured firms to move early, since lifting prices ahead of costs can contribute to above-band inflation that raises their own tax burden during the activation period, while the temporary and condition-bound design contains the downside in supply-shock episodes to the duration of above-band inflation rather than embedding a permanent setting.

Enforcement-controlled risks

  1. A conditional uplift could be expected to intensify avoidance and timing behaviour, including profit shifting, intra-group reclassification, and income or expense timing around anticipated activation periods, particularly among firms with sophisticated tax planning capacity. In this case, the same predictability that improves transparency also enables forward planning before published inflation prints, so the structure does little to self-limit the incentive to minimise exposure and the practical constraint comes primarily from the reach and enforceability of existing integrity settings rather than from the uplift design.

Interaction with other reforms

This measure interacts most strongly with competition policy and corporate tax integrity settings, because market power and avoidance capacity affect whether stabilisation pressure is absorbed, passed through, or minimised.

Implementation outline

Legislation would define corporate coverage, group treatment, the reference inflation statistic, the baseline company rate, and the method for applying and unwinding the temporary uplift, supported by alignment with existing anti-avoidance frameworks.

Member ballot

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What you’re deciding

Large corporations will pay an increased company tax rate equal to the gap between the national inflation rate and the upper bound of the Reserve Bank target band, with the rate returning to its baseline once inflation moves back within the target range.

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Ballot record

Wording: Original recorded wording · 27 Oct 2026

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37 · platform quorum met
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14 in the last 90 days
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Voting closes 8 December 2026

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Wording history and sources

1 snapshot

See how the wording has changed and which version was put to a ballot. References below provide background; they do not by themselves establish prior adoption.

  1. Original recorded wording · 27 Oct 2026legacy-6LatestBallot wording
    27 Oct 2026 · Initial wording

Policy background and sources

References to earlier policy and notes about what is known of its history.

Materially revised or submission/FAQ-derived

Cites only parliamentary inquiry submissions or general FAQ entries rather than formally approved national policy chapters, or explicitly introduces new/expanded mechanisms.

Scrutiny note: Cited antecedents do not establish approval of the new or expanded mechanism wording; requires AGM member review and ballot approval.

Prior policy predecessors

Values & principles alignment

  • Principle: *Inclusive Economic Advancement* — Adjusting corporate taxation seeks to relieve competitive pressure on smaller businesses.
  • Value: *Equity* — The tax adjustment seeks to correct the unequal bargaining position of smaller enterprises.