Restore Murray-Darling Rivers and Wetlands
Make CSIRO's independently determined environmental water needs binding across the Murray-Darling Basin, bring Commonwealth environmental water and enforcement of individual extraction rules into a consolidated MDBA, and allow the Authority to retain water-management and penalty revenue for Basin management and restoration.
- Proposed by
- Fusion Working Group
- Applies to
- Fusion NationalAuthority: Fusion National
- Ballot wording
- Draft wording (no ballot yet)0 ballots cast · 0 contributions
- Policy Registry
- Not yet adoptedUpdated
Key commitments
The water needed to keep the Basin's rivers, wetlands, and floodplains functioning will become a binding requirement for water management.
Commonwealth environmental water and Basin-wide water management will be brought under one authority.
Individual water extraction rules will be enforced consistently across the Basin rather than by separate state systems.
Strong enforcement will increase the resources available for future monitoring, investigation, and enforcement.
Water-management revenue and enforcement penalties will remain available to support the Basin rather than flowing into general government revenue.
Surplus revenue will provide an ongoing source of funding for riparian, wetland, and other Basin restoration.
Successful environmental restoration will be able to generate further Nature Repair and carbon-credit revenue for reinvestment in the Basin.
Rationale & background
Rationale & background
Design rationale
Responsibility for Murray-Darling water is currently divided between institutions. The MDBA manages Basin planning and parts of river operations, the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder separately manages federal environmental water, and state agencies administer allocations, metering, and most enforcement against individual water users. The Inspector-General of Water Compliance independently oversees compliance with the Basin Plan and water resource plans.
This divides responsibility for planning, environmental water, and actual water use even though they form parts of the same Basin-wide system.
The reform would consolidate operational responsibility in the MDBA while separating the two functions that benefit from independence: scientific determination of environmental needs would sit with CSIRO, and scrutiny of the MDBA would remain with the Inspector-General.
Binding environmental water needs
The CSIRO would independently determine and update the water needed to sustain the Basin's rivers, wetlands, floodplains, and other water-dependent ecosystems, using the best available hydrological and ecological science while allowing requirements to vary with conditions across the Basin.
Those requirements would bind the MDBA's allocation and river-management decisions. The MDBA could allocate water for irrigation, industry, and other consumptive uses only after the requirements are met.
Consolidated Basin management
The Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder's functions and water holdings would be brought into the MDBA, allowing Basin planning, environmental water management, and consumptive water management to operate within the same institution.
The MDBA would also become responsible for Basin-wide water accounting, monitoring, and enforcement of individual extraction rules, replacing separate state enforcement systems within the Basin.
This would establish one operational authority responsible for whether water is available, how it is managed, and whether individual users remain within their lawful allocations.
Water for new irrigated uses
The MDBA could restrict the use of Basin water for new irrigated developments where their water demand, drought resilience, or effects on the wider water system make them unsuitable for reliable supply.
These restrictions would apply to access to Basin water rather than what landowners may grow or develop. A landowner could proceed with an otherwise lawful development, but doing so would not create any entitlement to Basin water or justify preferential treatment during future shortages.
Any water taken outside the project's lawful entitlement would remain subject to the normal Basin-wide enforcement and penalty regime.
Enforcement and independent oversight
The MDBA would receive secure base funding and directly investigate and enforce individual extraction offences across the Basin.
Financial penalties would be retained for Basin purposes, allowing successful enforcement to increase the resources available for monitoring, metering, investigation, legal action, and other water-management functions.
The Inspector-General of Water Compliance would remain institutionally separate. Rather than duplicating frontline enforcement, it would independently audit whether the MDBA is accurately accounting for water, meeting the environmental requirements determined by CSIRO, enforcing extraction rules consistently, and properly exercising its powers.
Reinvesting Basin revenue
The consolidated MDBA would retain income generated through environmental water management, building on the existing ability to trade Commonwealth environmental water where doing so improves environmental outcomes.
Revenue retained from water management and enforcement would remain available for Basin functions. Surplus funds could be reinvested in environmental water and restoration of riparian areas, wetlands, floodplains, and other water-dependent ecosystems.
Where these projects qualify for Nature Repair certificates or subsequently generate eligible carbon credits, those proceeds could also be retained and reinvested in further Basin management and restoration.
This allows successful water management, enforcement, and ecological repair to progressively increase the resources available for further Basin recovery.
Residual risks
Future rainfall, runoff, and ecological responses cannot be forecast perfectly, particularly as the climate changes. Even with regular scientific updates, binding environmental water requirements may temporarily over- or underestimate the needs of particular parts of the Basin.
References
CSIRO — Murray-Darling Basin Sustainable Yields |
Murray-Darling Basin Authority — 2026 Basin Plan Review: What we heard |
Inspector-General of Water Compliance — How we work |
Inspector-General of Water Compliance — Annual Report 2024–25 |
Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water — Commonwealth environmental water trading framework |
Water Act 2007
Member ballot
What you’re deciding
Make CSIRO's independently determined environmental water needs binding across the Murray-Darling Basin, bring Commonwealth environmental water and enforcement of individual extraction rules into a consolidated MDBA, and allow the Authority to retain water-management and penalty revenue for Basin management and restoration.
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Wording history and sources
1 snapshotSee how the wording has changed and which version was put to a ballot. References below provide background; they do not by themselves establish prior adoption.
- Original recorded wording · 27 Oct 2026
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Policy background and sources
References to earlier policy and notes about what is known of its history.
Badged 'New — pending AGM vote' in the Reclaim static export (/pending-vote/), but outside the 36-policy AGM Round 1 lineage dataset.