Let the Cheapest Power Win in a Fair Market
Make electricity generation policy technology-neutral, with generators competing on cost and performance while meeting common emissions, safety, and grid-connection requirements.
- Proposed by
- Fusion Working Group
- Applies to
- Fusion NationalAuthority: Fusion National
- Ballot wording
- Draft wording (no ballot yet)0 ballots cast · 1 contribution
- Policy Registry
- Not yet adoptedUpdated
Key commitments
Electricity generators will compete more directly on the cost and performance of the power they produce.
Consumers will benefit when lower-cost generation can displace more expensive alternatives as technologies improve.
Investors will have stronger incentives to develop generation technologies that can deliver low-emissions electricity at lower cost.
Emerging energy technologies will gain a clearer path into the market when they can outperform established alternatives.
Australia will be able to reduce electricity emissions without locking the power system into technologies chosen before better options become available.
Rationale & background
Rationale & background
Design rationale
The objective of electricity policy should be to secure low-emissions electricity at the lowest sustainable cost, rather than to predetermine which technologies will provide it.
Different generation technologies have different combinations of capital cost, operating cost, fuel requirements, lifespan, availability, location, and environmental impacts. These relative advantages also change as technologies improve. Government policy should therefore establish the outcomes generators must meet and allow competition to determine which technologies can meet them most efficiently.
Technology-neutrality does not mean treating unlike technologies as physically identical. Safety, environmental, waste-management, and other requirements can differ where technologies create genuinely different risks. The principle is that a technology should not receive preferential treatment, or be excluded from consideration, simply because of the technology class to which it belongs.
Competing on the real cost of power
Competition should reflect the costs a generation project actually imposes on the electricity system, rather than comparing generation costs in isolation.
A project should not appear cheaper by shifting substantial connection, transmission, emissions, or other necessary costs onto consumers elsewhere in the system. Conversely, generation that can use existing infrastructure, locate close to demand, operate more consistently, or otherwise avoid wider system costs should retain the resulting competitive advantage.
This allows different technologies to compete on their complete economic merits without requiring government to prescribe the generation mix.
Interaction with carbon compliance
Technology-neutral generation depends on emissions being treated as a cost rather than controlled principally by prescribing eligible technologies.
Under the carbon-compliance framework, generators producing greenhouse emissions would remain responsible for the carbon compliance associated with those emissions. Low-emissions technologies would therefore retain an economic advantage because they avoid those costs, while technologies capable of reducing or capturing their emissions could compete where they can do so economically.
The electricity market could then pursue decarbonisation through competition over how cheaply emissions can be eliminated, rather than relying on technology-specific eligibility rules to determine which forms of low-emissions generation receive public support.
Interaction with electricity reliability
Generation and reliability would remain distinct economic functions.
By separating reliability from energy pricing, storage can earn revenue for shifting electricity through time and providing dependable supply without requiring large wholesale price swings to remain profitable.
Generators can therefore compete primarily on producing electricity efficiently, while the reliability system separately rewards the storage needed to make variable generation dependable. This avoids judging a low-cost generator as though it must independently provide every characteristic required by the complete electricity system.
Government support and market access
Where government policies support investment in new electricity generation, eligibility should be based on common emissions, performance, safety, and system requirements rather than being restricted to nominated generation technologies.
Technology-specific legal prohibitions that prevent an otherwise compliant generation technology from competing would also be inconsistent with a genuinely technology-neutral market. Removing such exclusions would not exempt that technology from appropriate licensing, safety, environmental, waste-management, or planning requirements.
Existing contractual commitments should not be retrospectively withdrawn merely to implement technology-neutrality. The reform should instead change the basis on which future generation investment is supported and regulated.
Nuclear generation
We would repeal the federal prohibition on civilian nuclear power generation and allow nuclear projects to compete under the same technology-neutral principles as other low-emissions generators.
This is because the existing prohibition limits meaningful price discovery. Because nuclear projects cannot legally proceed, producing an accurate Australian project cost has little commercial value: developers cannot build the project, financiers cannot fund it, and customers cannot contract for its output.
Cost estimates therefore have value primarily within the political debate over nuclear power. This creates an unusual incentive environment in which favourable and unfavourable estimates can have political consequences, while being wrong about the eventual construction price has no commercial consequence.
Repealing the prohibition would change that. Developers claiming nuclear can compete would need to test those claims through real sites, designs, supply contracts, financing, regulatory requirements, and willingness to commit capital. If nuclear cannot attract investment at competitive prices, the market would establish that without requiring a statutory prohibition.
Interaction with innovation policy
Technology-neutral electricity policy should not require every emerging technology to be commercially mature before research or demonstration can occur.
Early-stage technologies can continue to receive support through Australia's broader research and commercialisation systems. Once technologies reach commercial deployment, electricity policy should allow them to compete on their actual performance rather than protecting either established or emerging technologies from competition.
Residual risks
Technology-neutrality can become nominal rather than real if planning rules, network access, underwriting arrangements, taxation, or other policies continue to advantage particular technologies indirectly. Implementation would therefore need to assess electricity-market settings as a whole rather than merely removing technology names from individual programs.
Comparing projects solely by their plant-level generation cost could also favour projects that impose greater costs elsewhere in the electricity system. Cost comparisons must therefore preserve incentives for generators to minimise the wider infrastructure and system costs attributable to their investment.
Some technologies may also involve uncommon or long-duration risks that are difficult to represent through ordinary market prices. Technology-neutral competition does not remove the need for proportionate regulation of genuine safety, environmental, decommissioning, and waste-management risks.
References
Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water — Capacity Investment Scheme | Clean Energy Regulator — Eligibility for the Renewable Energy Target | Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 | Australian Renewable Energy Agency — Advancing Renewables Program | CSIRO — GenCost
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What you’re deciding
Make electricity generation policy technology-neutral, with generators competing on cost and performance while meeting common emissions, safety, and grid-connection requirements.
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Wording history and sources
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- Original recorded wording · 27 Oct 2026
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Policy background and sources
References to earlier policy and notes about what is known of its history.
Badged 'New — pending AGM vote' in the Reclaim static export (/pending-vote/), but outside the 36-policy AGM Round 1 lineage dataset.
Great approach. Can we find a single score "power generator" to "end user" metric that fully costs in the current and/or needed additional costs of the system (ie the 'different combinations of capital costs, operating cost, fuel requirements, lifespan, availability, location, environmental impacts, and connection, transmission, emissions, or other necessary costs) into the prposed assessment? Something that gives a standardised formula for actually evaluating any energy investment project (generation, transmission, storage, etc) a clear value for dollar invested score... so proposals across the system (over lifetime of operation) are evenly ranked for actual value?