Decision record
Give Small Business a Fair Shot
Outcome
A result has not been recorded for the ballot.
Voted wording
- Revision ID
legacy-fb416156a45d0343c58f78e5cdc93f9be3ce084db885293c6ac596e868bd4551- Content hash
ce73d3ccbf79106900f887a7e80a05f932fcb03258c31d703dd3f2b488bca02d- Recorded
- 27 Oct 2026
Give Small Business a Fair Shot
Corporations above an indexed revenue threshold will pay an increased company tax rate in proportion to the extent that their share of a market exceeds an ACCC-defined competitive threshold.
Outcomes
- Small businesses will face less pressure from dominant firms that can rely on scale and market control instead of better performance.
- Small suppliers will have stronger bargaining positions when dominant buyers face greater pressure to compete for their business.
- More growing firms will be able to compete on quality, price, and service without being crowded out by entrenched market power.
- Dominant firms will have stronger incentives to improve productivity and business performance instead of relying on further market concentration to lift profits.
- Consumers will see markets respond more closely to real competitive pressure rather than the pricing power of a few large incumbents.
- New entry and expansion will become more viable in concentrated sectors when dominance carries an increasing tax cost.
- Market competition will become more dynamic as firms have greater reason to innovate, specialise, or divest underperforming assets rather than simply absorb more share.
- Regulatory pressure on merger control and repeated competition intervention will ease where firms are pushed to compete through performance rather than concentration.
Design rationale
In concentrated markets, large firms can often increase profits through market control more easily than through better products, lower costs, or improved service. That power can operate downstream, through control over customers, or upstream, where dominant buyers can push prices, risks, or contractual terms onto smaller suppliers with few practical alternatives.
We would alter that incentive by making excess market dominance progressively less attractive as a profit strategy, so returns are more closely tied to innovation and competitive performance rather than scale alone.
Market concentration discipline
- Additional company tax liability would be linked to the extent that a firm exceeds a competitive market-share threshold where its market power is greatest. For consumer-facing firms this will usually be their share of sales, while intermediary processors and other major purchasers may instead be assessed by their share of purchases.
- The ACCC would determine the relevant market according to the products or services being traded, geographic constraints, available alternatives, and whether the firm's competitive power is principally exercised as a buyer or seller.
Innovation and competitive behaviour
- Dominant firms may be expected to respond by seeking higher margins through internal productivity gains, service improvements, or more efficient operations rather than simply expanding market share further. That change in incentive is the point: profits become easier to grow through better business performance than through continued concentration once the additional tax rate begins to scale upward.
- This can also create pressure for large firms to shed underperforming assets or avoid acquisitions that add scale without improving productivity, because growth that pushes further past the competitive threshold carries a rising tax cost. Where that occurs, market space opens more readily for smaller competitors and new entrants without requiring constant case-by-case intervention to produce the same effect.
System interaction
This measure interacts closely with merger control, misuse of market power rules, and ACCC market definition practice, because its practical effect depends on how sector boundaries are drawn and how concentration is assessed alongside existing competition law.
Risk and failure modes
- Firms may be expected to challenge sector definitions, restructure across related entities, or diversify across adjacent markets in ways that reduce their measured exposure without materially changing underlying market power. Integrity depends on whether the rule follows substantive economic control and market position rather than narrow corporate form or convenient classification.
- The tax can also underperform if competitive thresholds are set too high to change behaviour, too low to distinguish genuine dominance from ordinary scale, or too inconsistently across sectors to sustain confidence in the system. In practice, the discipline of the tax depends less on the headline mechanism than on credible threshold-setting and review processes.
Implementation outline
Legislation would define the covered corporate class, require sector allocation and competitive threshold determination, specify how market share is measured for tax purposes, and establish integrity treatment for corporate groups, related entities, and multi-sector firms, with ACCC and tax administration roles clearly separated but operationally aligned.
References
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission — Merger assessment guidelines | Australian Competition and Consumer Commission — Perishable agricultural goods inquiry report
Policy Lineage
- Submission: Excessive Pricing Prohibition for Supermarkets — Direct predecessor: an ACCC-calibrated market-dominance tax scaled to market share above a competitive threshold.
Values Alignment
- Principle: Inclusive Economic Advancement — Fairer market rules give smaller businesses a better chance to compete.
Ballot and result
- Ballot ID
proposal:POL-027- Purpose
- Decision on this proposal
- Electorate
- Party-wide
- Status
- Open
- Wording
legacy-fb416156a45d0343c58f78e5cdc93f9be3ce084db885293c6ac596e868bd4551Bound to voted wording- Closes
- 8 Dec 2026, 6:00 pm
The ballot has not been certified, so there is no recorded result.
Amendments
No amendments were filed.
Revision history
| Revision | Recorded | Content hash | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
Original recorded wording · 27 Oct 2026legacy-fb416156a45d0343c58f78e5cdc93f9be3ce084db885293c6ac596e868bd4551 | 27 Oct 2026 | ce73d3ccbf79106900f887a7e80a05f932fcb03258c31d703dd3f2b488bca02d | Ballot wording |
Publication
No policy record exists for this proposal, so nothing has been ratified or published.